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INTRODUCTION

hen dealing with questions relating to the continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles, it should be noted at the outset that the Arbitral Tribunal in
the arbitration between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago in 2006 pointed
out that “there is in law only a single continental shelf rather than an inner
shelf and a separate or outer continental shelf.” 1 This was confirmed by the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in 2012 in the
Bangladesh v. Myanmar case, stating that Article 76 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 2 embodies the concept of a
single continental shelf over which the coastal State exercises exclusive
sovereign rights in its entirety without any distinction being made between
the shelf within 200 nautical miles and the shelf beyond that limit. 3 Article
83 UNCLOS, dealing with the delimitation of the continental shelf between
States with opposite or adjacent coasts, likewise makes no distinction. 4 This
position has since been generally accepted by international courts and
tribunals.
Despite the fact that there is “in law” only a single continental shelf,
there is, nevertheless, an important difference in the legal obligations of
States Parties between the continental shelf within and beyond 200 nautical
miles. According to Article 82 UNCLOS, there are obligations of coastal
States, which are only applicable beyond that distance. 5 These obligations
relate to revenue sharing for the benefit of the international community by
coastal States in the form of “payments or contributions in kind in respect
of the exploitation of the non-living resources of the continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured.” 6

1. Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf (Barb. v.
Trin. & Tobago), 27 R.I.A.A. 147, 208–9 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006).
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 76, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS], www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/
texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.
3. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in
the Bay of Bengal (Bangl. v. Myan.), Case No. 16, Judgment, Mar. 14, 2012, ITLOS Rep.
4, 96, ¶ 361 [hereinafter Bangladesh v. Myanmar].
4. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 83.
5. Id. art. 82.
6. Id. art. 82(1).
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II.

BACKGROUND

Proposals made at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea (the Conference) to limit the legal continental shelf to a distance of 200
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured and to subsume it under the concept of the exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) did not find general agreement. The attempts by the
African Group, as well as by the Group of Landlocked and Geographically
Disadvantaged States, 7 failed because the doctrine of the continental shelf as
set out in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf8 and
reinforced in 1969 by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the North
Sea Continental Shelf cases 9 was already quite firmly anchored in international
law, 10 except for a clear definition of the outer limits. The States with broad
continental shelves therefore saw no reason to compromise on this issue.
The creation of the EEZ, recognizing the right of coastal States to
jurisdiction over the resources of some 85 million square kilometers of ocean
space, 11 covering approximately 36 percent of the surface of the seas and
accounting for almost 90 percent of fisheries, has been called one of the
most revolutionary features of UNCLOS. 12 This assessment, however,
somewhat underestimates the importance of the evolution of the concept of
the continental shelf, which had previously generally been considered “a
shallow-water offshore plain area.” 13 In view of the proliferation of claims

7. See also 2 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A
COMMENTARY 843–48 (Satya N. Nandan, Shabtai Rosenne & Neal R. Grandy eds., 1993)
[hereinafter UNCLOS 1982: A COMMENTARY].
8. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No.
5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
9. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J.
Rep. 3, ¶ 63 (Feb. 20).
10. See also Stephen Vasciannie, Landlocked and Geographically Disadvantaged States and the
Question of the Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf, 58 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 271, 272 (1987).
11. Michael W. Lodge, Implementation of the Common Heritage of Mankind, in REGIONS,
INSTITUTIONS, AND LAW OF THE SEA 129, 136 n.21 (Harry N. Scheiber & Jin-Hyun Paik
eds., 2013).
12. Gunnar Kullenberg, The Exclusive Economic Zone: Some Perspectives, 42 OCEAN AND
COASTAL MANAGEMENT 849, 855 (1999).
13. Yuri Kasmin, Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,
Introductory Statement at the Opening Meeting of the Commission on Limits of the
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by coastal States to the resources of the continental shelf following the 1945
Truman Proclamation, which had been motivated by the long-range
worldwide need for new sources of petroleum and other minerals, 14 the
adoption of the Continental Shelf Convention can, despite its undeniable
flaws, be considered a certain progress, at least by assuring some degree of
legal stability. Article 1 defined the continental shelf as the “seabed and
subsoil of submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the
territorial sea” and set forth two criteria for determining its outer limit: one
based on water depth of 200 meters and the other on the notion of resource
exploitability beyond that limit. 15
That Convention only received a limited number of ratifications as many
States did not agree with the open-ended exploitability criterion, which also
rendered the depth criterion practically useless. The acceptance by the ICJ
in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases of Article 1 as part of customary
international law 16 therefore seems rather bold. Shortly after that judgment,
the U.N. General Assembly “considered that the definition of the
continental shelf as contained in the Convention on the Continental
Shelf…does not define with sufficient precision the limits of that area” and
that “customary international law on the subject is inconclusive.” 17 The ICJ
in 1969 had also decided that the continental shelf constituted a “natural
prolongation” of “a coastal State’s land territory into and under the sea.” 18
In this connection, it should be remembered that the Court employed the
term “natural prolongation” to justify the appurtenance of the continental
shelf to the coastal States and not to clarify its outer limits. 19 Many States,
however, thereafter equated the concept of “natural prolongation” with the
Continental Shelf 3 (May 1, 2000), https://www.un.org/depts//los/clcs_new/
documents/CLCS_26.pdf.
14. Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil
and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Sept.
28, 1945).
15. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 8, art. 1. See Kevin A. Baumert,
The Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf under Customary International Law, 111 AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 827, 829 (2018).
16. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 9, ¶ 63.
17. G.A. Res. 2574 (XXIV) A, pmbl., para. 3 (Dec. 15, 1969).
18. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 9, ¶ 39.
19. Barbara Kwiatkowska, Creeping Jurisdiction beyond 200 Nautical Miles in the Light of the
1982 Law of the Sea Convention and State Practice, 22 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 153, 157 (1991).
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notion of the continental margin, that is, the geophysical shelf, the slope, and
the rise, 20 a view that would later find its way into UNCLOS.
III.

UNCLOS NEGOTIATIONS AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF

The protracted and extremely complicated negotiations at the Conference
lasted from 1974 to 1982. The current provisions of Article 76 UNCLOS
were accepted as a compromise, despite serious misgivings of many States.
There were three major reasons for the opposition of States to national
continental shelf rights beyond 200 nautical miles: First, there was the
perception that the acceptance of the concept of the EEZ, comprising living
and non-living resources, was already a major gain for most coastal States. 21
Second, it was considered essential to create an “economically meaningful
international area” with enough significant resources to be shared by all
States, 22 including those landlocked and geographically disadvantaged. Little
point was seen in creating an international organization for seabed
exploitation, which, according to the views of certain developing countries,
was destined to become a major organization with perhaps thousands of
employees if it did not have a substantial amount of resources to explore and
exploit. Third, in light of the experience with the Convention on the
Continental Shelf, it was thought that the application of geological or
geomorphological criteria in defining the outer limits of the continental shelf
would not be as precise as a simple distance or depth criterion.
The definition of the continental shelf now set forth in UNCLOS is once
again a legal conception that differs significantly from the scientific
definition. 23 Article 76, paragraph 1, provides that the continental shelf
comprises the seabed and subsoil beyond the territorial sea of the coastal
State “throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer
edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured”—

20. Baumert, supra note 15, at 833.
21. UNCLOS 1982: A COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 844–45.
22. Id.
23. Bjorn Kunoy, Establishment of the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf: Is Crossing
Boundaries Trespassing?, 26 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW 313,
316 (2011). See also UNCLOS 1982: A COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 873.
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even where no geological shelf exists. 24 This represents a significant change
from the provisions of the 1958 Convention. 25 The outer edge of the
continental margin is to be determined by two specific formulae—by outer
limit points based on sediment thickness, the so-called Irish or Gardiner
formula, or by a distance of not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot
of the continental slope, the so-called Hedberg formula, together with the
two restraints that are defined by a maximum distance of 350 nautical miles
from the baselines or 100 nautical miles from the 2,500-meter isobath. 26 The
opinion has been expressed it is unlikely that before the negotiations on what
was to become Article 76 the legal continental shelf extended to the outer
edge of the continental margin and that the ICJ in its 1969 judgment rather
seemed to equate the geophysical continental shelf with the legal continental
shelf. 27
It has been pointed out that Article 76 does not completely
accommodate the views of the broad-shelf States as the detailed provisions
on the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf may, in
certain cases, result in an outer limit landward of the outer edge of the
continental margin. 28 This new definition of the continental shelf can
nevertheless be considered a major success for these States as they succeeded
in persuading the Conference that “submarine areas adjacent to the coast”
include the entire continental margin. 29 It has been estimated that the
recognition of sovereign rights and jurisdiction of coastal States for these
areas has “reduced” the geographical extent of the international seabed
Area 30 by some 30 million square kilometers. 31 Thus, probably around 97
24. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 76(1). See also Kwiatkowska, supra note 19, at 154; Alex
Oude Elferink, Article 76 of the LOSC on the Definition of the Continental Shelf: Questions Concerning
its Interpretation from a Legal Perspective, 21 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND
COASTAL LAW 269, 275 (2006).
25. UNCLOS 1982: A COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 841.
26. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 76(5). See also HELMUT TUERK, REFLECTIONS ON THE
CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA, at 22 n.119 (2012).
27. Elferink, Article 76 of the LOSC, supra note 24, at 273–74.
28. Id. at 274. See also UNCLOS 1982: A COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 855–56.
29. See also Elferink, Article 76 of the LOSC, supra note 24, at 271–73.
30. Defined as the “seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.” UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 1(1)(1).
31. Michael W. Lodge, Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority,
Remarks at the Open Meeting of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf:
The Relevance and Importance of the Work of the Commission to the International Seabed
Authority 1–2 (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/documents/
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percent of maritime hydrocarbon resources are now under national
jurisdiction. 32
Experience has shown that the application of the two specific formulae
contained in Article 76 for determining the outer edge of the continental
margin is an often quite complicated, cost-intensive process requiring a high
level of expert knowledge, a process that in some cases may take many
years. 33 It has been recognized that from a geological perspective, there are
inherent difficulties in determining the thickness of sedimentary rocks and
the foot of the continental slope. 34 The comment has also been made that
Article 76 reflects the state of scientific knowledge at the time of its
elaboration and that subsequently gaps in that Article have been identified
that introduce “a measure of subjectivity” into the process of the
determination of the outer limit of the continental shelf. 35 The outer edge of
the continental margin may thus not always be as readily determined as had
been contended at the Conference by some of the proponents of these two
formulae. 36 The author of the Irish formula, Tony Gardiner, repeatedly tried
to convince delegates, including the author, that the practical application of
his proposal would not cause particular difficulties.
The issue as to whether the definition of the continental shelf contained
in Article 76 applies only to States Parties to UNCLOS or also to non-parties
was clearly decided by the ICJ in 2012 when it stated in the Nicaragua v.
Colombia judgment that it considers the entirety of paragraph 1 of Article 76
“part of customary international law.” 37 There are good arguments to
support paragraphs 2–7 of the Article, which provide the detailed rules that
implement the continental margin criterion of paragraph 1, also being part
of customary law, at least as far as the basic substantive rules contained
Presentations/6_CLCS_20_ANNIVERSARY_Lodge.pdf [hereinafter Lodge, Relevance
and Importance of the Work].
32. Helmut Tuerk, The Landlocked States and the Law of the Sea, 40 REVUE BELGE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 91, 104–5 (2007). See also Kullenberg, supra note 12, at 850–51.
33. UNCLOS 1982: A COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 878.
34. Id.
35. Informal comment by a member of the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf at a session of the 2018 Global Ocean Regime Conference in Jeju-do,
Republic of Korea, May 16–18.
36. Helmut Tuerk, The Common Heritage of Mankind after 50 Years, 57 INDIAN JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 259, 269 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1007/s40901-018-0085-8.
37. Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep.
624, 666, ¶ 118 (Nov. 19) [hereinafter Nicaragua v. Colombia].
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therein are concerned. 38 The ICJ, in the aforementioned judgment, had
determined that “it does not need to decide” whether the detailed provisions
of Article 76 form part of customary international law. 39
The question may be asked whether States which are not party to
UNCLOS may enjoy the benefits of Article 76 without having to comply
with the connected obligations. Paragraphs 2–7 of Article 76 not only
implement the continental margin criterion of paragraph 1, but they
substantively alter it as well. 40 In the Bangladesh v. Myanmar case, ITLOS
confirmed that paragraph 1 of Article 76 “should be understood in light of
the subsequent provisions of the Article defining the continental shelf and
the continental margin,” 41 namely paragraphs 2–7. It would hardly seem
acceptable to States Parties if a State not a party to UNCLOS were to base
its position exclusively on paragraph 1 of Article 76 and ignore the
conditions and constraints imposed by the following paragraphs. In such a
case, protests and non-recognition of these outer limit lines might well be
the consequence. 42 It can thus be concluded that the applicable law for
determining the spatial extent of the continental shelf is the same for all
coastal States, whether they are a party to UNCLOS or not. 43
The broad-shelf States had to make two compromises to have their
views on their sovereign rights and jurisdiction extending to the outer edge
of the continental margin accepted by the Conference. The most important
one is the principle of revenue sharing enshrined in Article 82 UNCLOS. 44
It can well be said that there is an inextricable link between that Article and
Article 76 as both provisions constitute an essential part of the “package
deal” approach underlying UNCLOS. 45 The second point is the requirement
for coastal States under paragraph 8 of Article 76 to delineate the outer limits
of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles “on the basis of”
38. See also Tullio Treves, Remarks on Submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf in Response to Judge Marotta’s Report, 21 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF
MARINE AND COASTAL LAW 363, 363 (2006). See also Baumert, supra note 15, at 853, 857.
39. Nicaragua v. Colombia, supra note 37, at 666, ¶ 118.
40. Baumert, supra note 15, at 848.
41. Bangladesh v. Myanmar, supra note 3, at 437, ¶ 114.
42. See also Baumert, supra note 15, at 855.
43. Id. at 870.
44. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 82.
45. UNCLOS 1982: A COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 834–35. See also SUZETTE V.
SUAREZ, THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF: LEGAL ASPECTS OF THEIR
ESTABLISHMENT 239, 239 (2008).
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recommendations by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
(CLCS), so that these limits may become “final and binding.” 46
IV.

THE DELIMITATION AND THE DELINEATION OF THE
CONTINENTAL SHELF

Any discussion of the delimitation and the delineation of the continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles must begin with the landmark judgment in
the Bangladesh v. Myanmar case. 47 The most important aspect of the judgment
by ITLOS, which can rightly be called historical, 48 was its decision to proceed
with the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles
before recommendations had been made by the CLCS, 49 an issue that
previously had mostly been avoided by international courts and tribunals. 50
According to Article 76, paragraph 10, UNCLOS, the provisions of that
Article are without prejudice to the question of delimitation of the
continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts. The
Tribunal noted that because of the pending boundary dispute, the CLCS had
deferred consideration of the submissions by Myanmar and Bangladesh in
accordance with Article 76 and Article 9 of Annex 2 UNCLOS. It observed
that a decision on its part not to exercise its jurisdiction over the dispute
relating to the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles would not only
fail to resolve a longstanding dispute but also would not be conducive to the
efficient operation of UNCLOS. 51 In the view of the Tribunal, it would be
contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention not to resolve the
existing impasse between the parties. Inaction by the CLCS and ITLOS, two
organs created by UNCLOS that are complementary to each other so as to
46. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 76(8).
47. See Gudmumdur Eriksson, The Bay of Bengal Case before the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea, in LAW OF THE SEA FROM GROTIUS TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR
THE LAW OF THE SEA: LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE HUGO CAMINOS 512 (Lilian del Castillo
ed., 2015). See also Shaun Lin & Clive Schofield, Lessons from the Bay of Bengal ITLOS Case:
Stepping Offshore for a ‘Deeper’ Maritime Political Geography, 180 GEOGRAPHICAL JOURNAL 260
(2014).
48. See Ioannis Konstantinidis, Between Villa Schröder (ITLOS) and the Peace Palace (ICJ):
Diverging Approaches to Continental Shelf Delimitation Beyond 200 Nautical Miles, 3 JOURNAL OF
TERRITORIAL AND MARITIME STUDIES, Summer-Fall 2016, at 28, 42 (2016).
49. Bangladesh v. Myanmar, supra note 3, at 102, ¶ 391.
50. Id. at 140 (declaration by Wolfrum, J.).
51. Bangladesh v. Myanmar, supra note 3, at 102, ¶ 391.
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ensure its coherent and efficient implementation, would leave the parties in
a position where they might be unable to benefit fully from their rights over
the continental shelf. 52
The underlying reasoning of the Tribunal has been the following: if
States Parties have been able to reach an agreement between themselves
regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles,
the CLCS sees no obstacle in considering the submissions under Article 76
regarding the delineation of the outer limits since there is no longer a dispute.
If an international court or tribunal decides the delimitation between States
Parties for that area of the continental shelf, the CLCS will find itself in a
similar position, as the dispute has been resolved.
ITLOS also emphasized that there is a clear distinction between the
delimitation of the continental shelf under Article 83 and the delineation of
its outer limits under Article 76. The exercise of its jurisdiction can,
therefore, not be seen as an encroachment on the functions of the CLCS.
The Tribunal concluded that to fulfill its responsibilities under the dispute
settlement provisions of Part XV, Section 2, UNCLOS, 53 it had an obligation
to adjudicate the dispute and to delimit the continental shelf between the
parties beyond 200 nautical miles—without prejudice to the establishment
of the outer limits of the continental shelf under Article 76, paragraph 8. 54
To proceed to delimitation, ITLOS first had to determine whether the
parties had overlapping entitlements to a continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles. 55 It considered the meaning of “natural prolongation” and its
interrelationship with that of the “outer edge of the continental margin” in
the application of Article 76, notions closely related and referring to the same
area. 56 Entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles should
thus be determined by reference to the outer edge of the continental margin
to be ascertained in accordance with Article 76, paragraph 4. 57 It has been
remarked that by refraining from accepting the idea of natural prolongation
based on geological and related factors, ITLOS missed a chance to clarify
whether and to what extent geological and geomorphological factors should

52. Id. at 120, ¶ 392.
53. UNCLOS, supra note 2, pt. XV, § 2.
54. Bangladesh v. Myanmar, supra note 3, at 102–3, ¶¶ 393, 394.
55. Id. at 105, ¶ 397.
56. Id. at 113, ¶ 434.
57. Id. at 113, ¶ 437.
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play a role in the determination of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
miles. 58
In its judgment, ITLOS also noted that the Bay of Bengal presented a
“unique situation” and was satisfied that there was a continuous and
substantial layer of sedimentary rocks extending from Myanmar’s coast to
the area beyond 200 nautical miles. 59 It concluded that both Bangladesh and
Myanmar had an entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles
based on the thickness of sedimentary rocks according to the formula
contained in Article 76, paragraph 4 (a)(i); 60 the geographic origin of such
sediments being not relevant. It further observed that it was also clear from
the submissions of both parties to the CLCS that those entitlements
overlap. 61 In this connection, the comment has been made that if the origin
of the sedimentary rocks of a relevant continental shelf were a consideration,
then Nepal and China might have as much claim to the seabed of the Bay of
Bengal as the riparian States. 62
Overlapping entitlements are a precondition for a court or tribunal to
delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. The ICJ, in its 2012
judgment in the Nicaragua v. Colombia case, rejected the request by Nicaragua
for delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles as
Nicaragua had not followed the procedures prescribed by Article 76,
paragraph 4—it had only submitted “Preliminary Information” to the
CLCS—and did not prove that its continental margin extended sufficiently
to overlap with the 200 nautical miles continental shelf to which Colombia
is entitled. 63 Given the object and purpose of UNCLOS, as stated in its
preamble, the Court held that the fact that Colombia is not a party did not
relieve Nicaragua of its obligations under Article 76. 64 As regards a clear
distinction between the delimitation of the continental shelf and the
delineation of its outer limits, the Court concurred with the jurisprudence of
ITLOS. 65
58. Yao Huang & Xuexia Liao, Natural Prolongation and Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
Beyond 200 nm: Implications of the Bangladesh/Myanmar Case, 4 ASIAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 281, 302 (2014).
59. Bangladesh v. Myanmar, supra note 3, at 115, ¶ 444.
60. Id. at 115, ¶ 445.
61. Id. at 115, ¶¶ 444–45.
62. Huang & Liao, supra note 58.
63. Nicaragua v. Colombia, supra note 37, at 668, ¶ 124.
64. Id. at 48–49, ¶¶ 126–29.
65. Id. at 48, ¶ 125.
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In the Bangladesh v. India case, 66 there was no question for the Arbitral
Tribunal in its 2014 award, nor for the Special Chamber of ITLOS in its
judgment of 2017 in the Ghana v. Cote d´Ivoire case 67 that an overlapping
entitlement existed, and delimitation could therefore be effected without
prior delineation of the continental shelf based on a recommendation by the
CLCS. With regard to Nicaragua’s request to delimit the boundary of its
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles and that of the continental shelf
of Colombia, the ICJ in its 2016 judgment also followed the jurisprudence
of ITLOS in the Bangladesh v. Myanmar case. The Court considered that since
delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles could be
undertaken independently of a recommendation from the CLCS, the latter
is not a prerequisite that needs to be satisfied by a State party to UNCLOS
before it can ask the Court to settle a dispute with another State over such a
delimitation. 68 Support for the approach adopted by ITLOS has been
reinforced and reiterated, thus endorsing its jurisprudence on the
delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. 69
In delimiting the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles between
Bangladesh and Myanmar, ITLOS used the equidistance/relevant
circumstances method, which in recent years has become the preferred
method used by international courts and tribunals to achieve an equitable
solution as required by Article 83, paragraph 1, UNCLOS. 70 The Tribunal
indicated that the delimitation method employed for the continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles should not differ from that within 200 nautical
miles. The adjusted equidistance line delimiting both the EEZ and the
continental shelf within 200 nautical miles would thus continue in the same
66. Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangl. v. India), Award, 138–41, ¶¶
456–58 (UNCLOS Annex VII Arb. Trib. 2014), https://pcacases.com/web/
sendAttach/383.
67. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire in the
Atlantic Ocean (Ghana v. Cote d’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment, Sept. 23, 2017. ITLOS
Rep. 4, 131–42, ¶¶ 482–527 [hereinafter Ghana v. Cote d’Ivoire].
68. Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and
Colombia beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicar. v. Colom.),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 2016 I.C.J. Rep. 100, 137, ¶ 114 (Mar. 17). See also
Massimo Lando, Delimiting the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles at the International
Court of Justice: The Nicaragua v. Colombia Case, 16 CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 137 (2017).
69. Konstantinidis, supra note 48, at 48.
70. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 83(1).
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direction beyond the 200-nautical-mile limit of Bangladesh until it reached
the area where the rights of third States (India in this case) may be affected. 71
This is a logical consequence of the fact that there is only one single
continental shelf, which has also become uncontested jurisprudence. 72
If the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is
not strictly based on an equidistance line, as in that case, this results in a socalled “grey area” of overlapping rights and jurisdiction. 73 The Tribunal
decided that in the area beyond the EEZ of Bangladesh that is within the
limits of Myanmar’s EEZ, the maritime boundary delimits the parties’ rights
to the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf but does not otherwise
limit Myanmar’s rights with respect to the EEZ, notably as regards the
superjacent waters. Each State must, therefore, exercise its rights and
perform its duties with due regard to the rights and duties of the other in
accordance with the relevant provisions of UNCLOS. 74 ITLOS also pointed
out that there are many ways in which these States may ensure the discharge
of their obligations in this respect, including the conclusion of specific
agreements or the establishment of appropriate cooperative arrangements. 75
This was the first time that an international court or tribunal pronounced
itself on the question of the “grey area.” A similar situation arose in the
Bangladesh v. India Arbitration, resulting in three “grey areas” with
overlapping continental shelf and EEZ rights, involving not only Bangladesh
and India but also Myanmar. 76 The solutions adopted by ITLOS and the
Arbitral Tribunal may not be ideal, as they pose certain challenges to the
States concerned. There can be no doubt that, whenever possible, a single
boundary line delimiting both the seabed and the water column is
preferable, 77 which has also become general practice. Thus far, no
cooperative agreements or arrangements have yet been concluded by the
riparian States of the Bay of Bengal. It, however, seems that at least for now
these “grey areas” are not a significant problem. A solution might be to turn
71. Bangladesh v. Myanmar, supra note 3, at 130, ¶ 463.
72. See, e.g., Ghana v. Cote d’Ivoire, supra note 67, at 142, ¶ 526.
73. Bangladesh v. Myanmar, supra note 3, at 130, ¶ 464.
74. Id. at 133, ¶¶ 474–75.
75. Id. at 121, ¶ 476.
76. Raghavendra Mishra, The ‘Grey’ Area in the Northern Bay of Bengal: A Note on a
Functional Cooperative Solution, 47 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 29,
30–34 (2016).
77. Helmut Tuerk, 20 Years of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS): An
Overview, 2016 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 449, 475 (2016).
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these relatively small areas into zones of joint development and
management. 78
In this context it should also be borne in mind that the provisions of
UNCLOS relating to the EEZ, on the one hand, and those concerning the
continental shelf on the other were not harmonized as the broad-margin
States endeavored to keep the regime of the continental shelf unaffected by
the new concept of the EEZ. There is, therefore, no subordination one way
or the other between the respective regimes. They exist side by side just as
the continental shelf regime has from its very beginning coexisted with that
of the high seas. In both the above-mentioned cases, the tribunals concerned
refrained from commenting on any relative primacy in the “grey areas,” be
it of the EEZ or the continental shelf. 79
International jurisprudence has thus amply clarified the relationship
between delimitation and delineation for the continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles. The term “delineation” seems to have first appeared in a
proposal submitted at the Conference by the United States in 1975 in
connection with the suggested establishment of a “Continental Shelf
Boundary Commission,” 80 which was to become the CLCS. Three important
suggestions made in the course of the negotiations regarding such a
commission were, however, not retained in UNCLOS: the participation of
legal expertise in that body, the relationship between delineation of the
continental shelf and the dispute settlement procedures, and the possibility
for the International Seabed Authority (ISA/the Authority) to submit a
continental shelf delineation to the commission for review. 81 The reason
seems to have been the endeavor of important coastal States to restrict the
role of such a body to the consideration of scientific and technical aspects
of delineation and to ensure further that a coastal State would not have to
face an international authority in any scientific dispute—nor in legal
proceedings.
Although it is the coastal State that is entitled to establish the outer limits
of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, as already referred to, these
limits, according to Article 76, paragraph 3, only become “final and binding”
if adopted “on the basis of” recommendations by the CLCS. 82 The coastal
States concerned have to submit particulars of these outer limits to the CLCS
78. Mishra, supra note 76, at 36.
79. Id. at 33.
80. See also UNCLOS 1982: A COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 848–49.
81. Id. at 850.
82. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 76(8).
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with supporting scientific and technical data. The expression “on the basis
of” a recommendation represents a compromise between those States that
had proposed the coastal State only needed to take recommendations by the
CLCS “into account” when establishing the outer limits and those that had
advocated strict adherence by States to them and thus had suggested “in
accordance with.” 83 The term “on the basis of,” suggested by the United
States, allows the coastal State some, but perhaps not too much flexibility
concerning the implementation of the recommendations of the CLCS. 84
As to the meaning of “final and binding,” it is obvious that this applies
to the coastal State making the submission to the CLCS. The argument has
been made that it does not apply to third States and the international
community as neither of these groups is a party to the submission process. 85
In any case, other State parties—as well as the ISA—will also be bound by
these outer limits except for those States which explicitly challenge them.
The main reason for providing in UNCLOS definite limits for the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles was to provide for legal stability
in contrast to the previously existing situation. The question is whether any
State party could mount a challenge or whether individual legal interests
would have to be shown, be it in respect of delimitation, high seas freedoms,
or mining sites in the international seabed Area. 86 This is, however, a matter
to be considered in the framework of the dispute settlement procedures
provided for in UNCLOS. Although directly affected by the delineation of
the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles by a coastal State, as
mentioned above, no role in the proceedings has been given to the ISA. 87 It
has rightly been pointed out that it might have been sensible to provide for
such a possibility in a contentious case, since an extensive continental shelf
reduces the geographical extent of the international seabed Area, and,
correspondingly, the scope of the activities of the Authority. 88
After having established the outer limits of the continental shelf, the
coastal State, under Article 76, paragraph 9, is under an obligation to deposit
83. Elferink, Article 76 of the LOSC, supra note 24, at 280.
84. TUERK, REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 26,
at 23.
85. See SUAREZ, supra note 45, at 249.
86. Id. at 247, 250.
87. See also id. at 250; Lodge, Relevance and Importance of the Work, supra note 31, at
2.
88. John E. Noyes, Judicial and Arbitral Proceedings and the Outer Limit of the Continental
Shelf, 42 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1211, 1239 (2009).
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charts and relevant information, including geodetic data, permanently
describing the outer limits of its continental shelf to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations. According to Article 84, the State is also obliged to
show the outer limit lines of the continental shelf and the limits of
delimitation on charts adequate for ascertaining their position, or, where
appropriate, lists of geographical coordinates of points specifying the
geodetic datum. 89 The charts have to be given due publicity and copies
deposited with the U.N. Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the
ISA. The difference between the two provisions is that in the first instance
it is the task of the UN Secretary-General to give due publicity to such
information while in the second case it is the coastal State. 90
These provisions are intended to make available to the international
community information on the outer limits of the continental shelf set by
the coastal State. 91 At what point in time would other States have the
possibility to challenge these limits, for example, with the argument that the
provisions of UNCLOS have not been correctly applied, that the limits have
not been established “on the basis of” recommendations by the CLCS, 92 or
that they are based on insufficient or flawed scientific data? 93 Appropriate
points would seem to be, for instance, after the coastal State has enacted
legislation setting the outer limits of the continental shelf or after the U.N.
Secretary-General has given due publicity to the information received from
the coastal State. 94 Experience with the limits of other maritime zones set by
coastal States has, however, shown that most members of the international
community are quite reluctant to react to maritime boundaries established
by other States when their immediate interests are not involved. There are

89. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 84(1).
90. UNCLOS 1982: A COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 883.
91. Id. at 882–83.
92. Alex Oude Elferink, The Establishment of Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200
Nautical Miles by the Coastal State: The Possibilities of Other States to Have an Impact on the Process,
24 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW 535, 554 (2009).
93. See TUERK, REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA, supra note
26, at 23. See also generally Anna Cavnar, Accountability and the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf: Deciding Who Owns the Ocean Floor, 42 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL 387 (2009). See also Rüdiger Wolfrum, The Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf:
Procedural Considerations, in LE PROCÈS INTERNATIONAL – LIBER AMICORUM JEAN-PIERRE
COT 349 (Robert Badinter ed., 2009).
94. See also Elferink, Article 76 of the LOSC, supra note 24, at 282.
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good reasons to assume that this attitude is basically no different concerning
delineation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.
Delineation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles has a
direct bearing on the extent of the international seabed Area. This is also
illustrated by Article 134, paragraph 4, UNCLOS, dealing with the scope of
Part XI, which provides that nothing in that Article “affects the
establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf in accordance with
Part VI.” 95 It seems obvious, however, that the States Parties working
collectively within the framework of the ISA entrusted with administering
the common heritage of mankind, need to know where national jurisdiction
ends, and the international seabed Area begins. 96 Otherwise it would, for
instance, not be possible to comply with Article 142 UNCLOS according to
which activities in the Area with respect to resource deposits which lie across
the limits of national jurisdiction are to be conducted with “due regard to
the rights and legitimate interests of any coastal State across whose
jurisdiction such deposits lie.” 97
At the Conference, the negotiators were led to believe that no more than
thirty to thirty-five States would be able to claim an entitlement to a
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. 98 At present, there are, however,
indications that there will be up to eighty-five such States, 99 with the
consequence of further considerably diminishing the international seabed
Area. Through the end of 2019, eighty-five submissions, including revised
or partial revised submissions, have been made to the CLCS claiming such
entitlements. It has been estimated that the total number of submissions by
95. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 134(1).
96. Lodge, The Relevance and Importance of the Work, supra note 31, at 1.
97. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 142(1).
98. See George Taft, Applying the Law of the Sea Convention and the Role of the Scientific
Community Relating to Establishing the Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf Where it Extends beyond
the 200 Mile Limit, in LAW, SCIENCE & OCEAN MANAGEMENT 470 (Myron H. Nordquist,
Ronán Long, Tomas H. Heidar & John N. Moore eds., 2007).
99. Clive Schofield & Robert van de Poll, Exploring the Outer Continental Shelf (Working
Paper prepared for the International Workshop on Further Consideration of the
Implementation of Article 82 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
1982, Beijing, 26-30 November 2012), in INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY,
IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 82 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW
OF THE SEA: ISA TECHNICAL STUDY NO: 12, annex 5, at 69 (2013),
https://isa.org.jm/files/files/documents/ts12-web.pdf [hereinafter ISA TECHNICAL
STUDY NO: 12]
248

The Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles

Vol. 97

coastal States will approach 120. 100 There is the further question of those
States that are not or not yet parties to UNCLOS and might also have claims
to continental shelf entitlements beyond 200 nautical miles. 101 It would seem
that nothing prohibits these States from making a submission to the CLCS.
It would then be up to it, as an autonomous body, to decide whether to
consider the submission. 102
The argument has been put forth that non-parties have not been
excluded from the mandate of the CLCS because Article 76 refers exclusively
to “coastal States,” as does Annex II UNCLOS except for the Article 2
provisions relating to organizational matters of the CLCS. 103 The term
“coastal State” instead of “State party” in that context, as well as in other
provisions of UNCLOS, has, however, most likely been employed to
exclude landlocked States because even an implicit reference to them would
not have made sense. Nevertheless, should a non-party file a submission
with the CLCS, it might be wise for the Commission to consider it and
appropriately apprise the Meeting of States Parties 104 of the submission. In
any case, if a non-party wishes to engage in such a course of action, it would
not make sense from the point of view of the interests of the international
community to prevent that State from doing so. It would also seem
reasonable that in such a case the non-party would be asked to defray the
costs of processing its application, the amount to be determined by the
Meeting of States Parties.
In the case of the EEZs, it is not very difficult to know the limits of
national jurisdiction, at least for those States Parties that have declared such
a zone. For continental shelves, however, the situation is more complex as
relatively few of the States having continental shelves extending beyond 200
100. Gaia Carrera Hurtado, An Update of the Status of Submissions to the CLCS and
Notes relating to Disputes among States, Global Ocean Regime Conference, Busan,
Republic of Korea, June 10, 2016, slide 22 (on file with author). See also Submissions, through
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,
pursuant to Art. 76, para. 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December
1982, UN OCEANS AND LAW OF THE SEA, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/
commission_submissions.htm [hereinafter Article 76(8) Submissions] (last visited Jan. 14,
2021).
101. Tuerk, The Common of Heritage of Mankind after 50 Years, supra note 36, at 269
102. See also Treves, supra note 38, at 364; Baumert, supra note 15, at 865.
103. Baumert, supra note 15, at 866–69.
104. The U.N. Secretary-General “shall . . . convene necessary meetings of States
Parties.” UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 2(e).
249

International Law Studies

2021

nautical miles have yet established the outer limits. 105 As of May 1, 2020, the
CLCS had adopted only thirty-five recommendations on the outer limits of
the continental shelf 106 and only eight States—Australia, France (concerning
Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guyana, New Caledonia, and the Kerguelen
islands), Ireland, Mauritius, Mexico, Niue, Pakistan, and the Philippines—
have fulfilled their obligation under Article 84, paragraph 2, UNCLOS to
deposit charts or lists of geographical coordinates with the Secretary-General
of the ISA showing these limits. 107 This is certainly not a very heartening
record. The Secretary-General has therefore urged all coastal States to
deposit the relevant information as soon as possible after the establishment
of the outer limit lines of their continental shelf, in accordance with the
relevant provisions of UNCLOS. 108
Although the CLCS has made substantial progress in its work during the
past years dealing with voluminous submissions of considerable complexity,
it is still faced with an immense workload. 109 The UNCLOS framers did not
foresee this situation and thus not provided adequate structures for the
CLCS and the work of its members. 110 Whether it was wise not to include
lawyers on the CLCS is another matter as legal issues are almost inevitably
bound to arise in connection with the delineation of the continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles. Given its current workload, it may take decades
for the CLCS to make all the recommendations regarding the submissions
by coastal States with respect to the outer limits of the continental shelf.

105. Lodge, Relevance and Importance of the Work, supra note 31, at 1–2. See also
Michael W. Lodge, International Seabed Authority Mining Standards, in THE REGULATION OF
CONTINENTAL SHELF DEVELOPMENT: RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 79, 80
(Myron H. Nordquist, John N. Moore, Aldo Chircop & Ronán Long eds., 2013).
106. Article 76(8) Submissions, supra note 100.
107. Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority under
Article 166, Paragraph 4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ¶ 7,
Doc. ISBA/24/A/2 (May 29, 2018). See also Statement by the President of the Assembly of
the International Seabed Authority on the Work of the Assembly at its Twenty-fourth
Session, ¶¶ 9, 14, Doc. ISBA/24/A/12 (Aug. 10, 2018); Article 84(2) – Charts and Lists of
Geographical Coordinates, INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY, https:/www.isa.org.jm/
article-842-charts-and-lists-geographical-coordinates (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).
108. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 107, ¶ 8.
109. See Letter dated 18 April 2016 from the Chair of the Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf addressed to the President of the Twenty-sixth Meeting of States
Parties, ¶¶ 9, 11, Doc. SPLOS/298 (Apr. 18, 2016).
110. Tuerk, The Common of Heritage of Mankind after 50 Years, supra note 36, at 269.
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In cases where a coastal State disagrees with the recommendation of the
CLCS, it has to make a revised or a new submission “within a reasonable
time.” 111 The question arises for how long such a procedure might continue
if there is no agreement between the State concerned and the CLCS.
Furthermore, where there are delimitation disputes between States—and
there are quite a few—the final determination of the outer limits may be
delayed for an indefinite period. 112
After more than a quarter of a century since the entry into force of
UNCLOS, the boundary between national jurisdiction and the international
seabed Area still remains largely undefined. It has rightly been commented
that this is a very unsatisfactory situation, making it more difficult for States
Parties, acting through the ISA, to organize and control activities in the
Area. 113 Furthermore, it creates uncertainty in the law of the sea that the
UNCLOS framers had tried to avoid. 114 Despite this unsatisfactory situation,
it may nevertheless be assumed that the seabed and ocean floor beyond
national jurisdiction cover some 50 percent of the world’s surface. 115
V.

REVENUE SHARING UNDER ARTICLE 82

In light of this perhaps somewhat pessimistic outlook as regards a definite
global boundary of the international seabed Area, it should be pointed out
that revenue sharing under Article 82 UNCLOS, which has been referred to
as the “only direct incursion into ocean space within national jurisdiction,” 116
can be considered an extension of the principle of the common heritage of

111. UNCLOS, supra note 2, annex II, art. 9.
112. Lodge, Relevance and Importance of the Work, supra note 31, at 2.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Michael W. Lodge, Current Legal Developments: International Seabed Authority, 24
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW 185, 185 (2009). See also David
Freestone, International Governance, Responsibility and Management of Areas beyond National
Jurisdiction, 27 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR MARINE AND COASTAL LAW 191, 193 (2012).
116. Wylie Spicer, Canada, The Law of the Sea Treaty and International Payments: Where Will
the Money Come From?, 8 UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY, THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY, SPP
RESEARCH PAPERS 31, at 9 (2015), http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/
uploads/2016/03/final-law-sea-spicer.pdf.
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mankind, 117 although this view is not undisputed. 118 In any case, the
responsibilities of the ISA in this context are limited to the various aspects
of revenue sharing. It has no power to set standards for the exploration or
exploitation of an area within national jurisdiction.
The idea that coastal States should make payments to the international
community arising from the exploitation of the non-living resources of the
continental shelf dates back to discussions in the U.N. Seabed Committee in
1971 in connection with the endeavors to define its outer limits. A system
of contributions to an international authority to be created would have
applied to variously-defined maritime areas beyond the territorial sea with
different percentage rates based on distance from its outer limit and for
developing or developed countries. In the course of the Conference it
became, however, increasingly clear that revenue sharing within 200 nautical
miles would not find general agreement, despite a number of proposals to
that effect. The same was true regarding the suggestion that the international
authority to be created would have the power to take appropriate measures
if a State failed to comply with its revenue-sharing obligations 119—a proposal
to which some States were opposed as soon as it was made.
Article 82 UNCLOS in its present form thus represents a compromise
between various national positions. 120 Coastal States with a continental shelf
extending beyond 200 nautical miles must make annual payments or
contributions in kind when exploiting the non-living resources beyond that
distance after the first five years of production at a site. The rate of payments
or contributions will annually rise from 1 percent at the beginning to 7
percent of the value or the volume of production at the site as of the twelfth
year after the commencement of exploitation. 121 A developing State which is
a net importer of a mineral resource produced from its continental shelf is
exempt from making such payments or contributions with respect to that
117. See Michael W. Lodge, The International Seabed Authority and Article 82 of the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 21 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR MARINE AND COASTAL
LAW 323 (2006).
118. See INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY, ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 82 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW
OF THE SEA: TECHNICAL STUDY NO: 4, at 23 (2009), https://www.isa.org.jm/
documents/issues-associated-implementation-article-82-united-nations-convention-lawsea [hereinafter TECHNICAL STUDY NO: 4].
119. UNCLOS 1982: A COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 937, 938.
120. Id. at 846, 857.
121. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 82(2).
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resource. Production does not, however, include resources used in
connection with the exploitation.
With the benefit of hindsight, the five-year grace period thought to be a
reasonable time during which the operator would be able to recover
development costs is probably somewhat too short given the enormous
financial outlay required for deep-sea mining in great depths. When this
provision was drafted, oil and gas wells were in much shallower water and
closer to the shore than is the case today. 122 The percentage of the
contributions made by coastal States was a controversial issue at the
Conference, with suggestions put forth during protracted negotiations
ranging between 5 and 15 percent. 123 When the matter was once again
discussed in the responsible negotiating group, the author, as a delegate of
Austria, suggested 7 percent as a compromise, 124 which subsequently found
its way into UNCLOS. The rationale for this relatively low figure was not to
cause a disincentive for the exploitation of the seabed beyond 200 nautical
miles. 125
Article 82 has been characterized as having “textual ambiguities and
process gaps that can be expected to constrain implementation.” 126 Indeed,
Article 82 does not provide definitions for key terms used, such as “value,”
“volume,” “site,” “payments,” and “contributions in kind.” 127 At the
Conference, the negotiators were, however, hesitant to suggest too much
detail in order not to upset a complicated negotiating process. They were
also aware they were legislating for an unknown point in time in the future
and further believed that some issues were better left to Article 82’s
implementation phase. Some of the terms used in that Article may be
understood differently in States with a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
miles. 128 The ISA Secretariat has, therefore, commissioned a comparative
study to “help identify possible paths for a practical approach” and in
developing the understanding of “terminological issues in realistic
122. Spicer, supra note 116, at 12.
123. ISA TECHNICAL STUDY NO: 12, supra note 99, at 57. See also UNCLOS 1982: A
COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 954.
124. UNCLOS 1982: A COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 940, 941. See also TECHNICAL
STUDY NO: 4, supra note 118, at 17.
125. TUERK, REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 26,
at 39.
126. ISA TECHNICAL STUDY NO: 12, supra note 99, at 57.
127. Id. at 20, ¶ 10.
128. Id.
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settings.” 129 A guide would certainly be highly useful to assist States with
implementing the provisions of that Article. 130
In this context, the following comments are offered. It seems clear that
the obligation to make payments or contributions in kind is that of the
coastal State, not the producer. Producers might well also argue that they
already provide benefits to the economy in the form of taxes, employment,
and existing royalties; thus, it should not be incumbent upon them to bear
the additional cost of meeting the State’s treaty obligation. 131 If Article 82
were interpreted otherwise, exploitation of the resources of the continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles might become unattractive compared to
exploitation within that distance, defeating its entire purpose. A positive
example is the New Zealand legislation that directs the Minister of Energy
and Resources to consider New Zealand’s obligations under Article 82 in
specifying the rate of royalties and provides that the government will make
all payments under that provision. 132 Norway, in contrast, has opted for a
somewhat different system, alerting bidders that the licensee may be required
to cover an expense under Article 82, the cost of which can be deducted
under the petroleum taxation. 133 Revenue sharing may be an issue in States
with a federal system as regards the respective responsibilities of the national
government and the constituent units. For instance, in Canada, a country
that might be among the first to become subject to the Article 82
obligation. 134
In the calculation of the “value . . . of production at the site,” 135 the
negotiating history of Article 82 suggests that reference to the “well-head
value” is intended. 136 With regard to the definition of “site,” it has been
suggested that the most practical approach would likely be to leave this

129. ISA TECHNICAL STUDY NO: 12, supra note 99, at 24. See INTERNATIONAL SEABED
AUTHORITY, A STUDY OF KEY TERMS IN ARTICLE 82 OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: TECHNICAL STUDY: NO: 15 (2016),
https://isa.org.jm/files/files/documents/ts15-web_0.pdf.
130. See also ISA TECHNICAL STUDY NO: 12, supra note 99, at 24, ¶ 25.
131. Lodge, The International Seabed Authority and Article 82, supra note 117, at 326.
132. Continental Shelf Act 1964, § 5A(5).
133. Spicer, supra note 116, at 16.
134. Id. at Summary, 18–20. See also Tuerk, The Common Heritage of Mankind after 50 Years,
supra note 36, at 267.
135. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 82(2).
136. Lodge, The International Seabed Authority and Article 82, supra note 117, at 328.
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determination to the State involved. 137 As far as the “resources used in
connection with the exploitation” 138 are concerned, a correct interpretation
of this expression would seem to restrict these to physical elements used in
production and not to include financial or other resources required in the
process. 139
The payments or contributions in kind by coastal States are to be made
through the ISA, which is then to distribute them to “States Parties . . . on
the basis of equitable sharing criteria, taking into account the interests and
needs of developing States, particularly the least developed and the
landlocked among them.” 140 It is important to note that payments or
contributions under that provision are to be made “through” the ISA and
not “to” it as proposed in earlier drafts of the Article. 141 This means that the
Authority can be considered a trustee of the payments received until their
distribution to the beneficiary States. 142 These funds are distinct from any
revenues collected by the ISA from deep-sea mining operations under Part
XI UNCLOS and must be distributed. 143 It would nevertheless seem
reasonable to allow the Authority to recover administrative costs incurred in
the processing of the payments received. There would seem to be little
justification for using funds from its regular budget for such a purpose.
Although it is for the coastal State to choose between payments and
contributions in kind, the latter does not seem to be a very realistic option
as this would put the ISA in the extremely difficult position of having to deal
directly with seabed resources and oversee their distribution or marketing
and subsequent sale. 144 Contributing States should therefore be encouraged
to discharge their obligation under Article 82 based solely on payments made
in an internationally convertible currency. 145
UNCLOS provides no guidance on how and at what point in time the
ISA is to become involved in the implementation of Article 82. It should be
borne in mind that the Authority will have to discharge substantial
responsibilities in this connection, requiring advanced planning and
137. ISA TECHNICAL STUDY NO: 12, supra note 99, at 22, ¶ 14.
138. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 82(2).
139. ISA TECHNICAL STUDY NO: 12, supra note 99, at 21, ¶¶ 11, 12.
140. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 82(4).
141. UNCLOS 1982: A COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 942.
142. ISA TECHNICAL STUDY NO: 12, supra note 99, at 19, ¶ 4.
143. UNCLOS 1982: A COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 947.
144. Tuerk, The Common Heritage of Mankind after 50 Years, supra note 36, at 267.
145. Id. See also ISA TECHNICAL STUDY NO: 12, supra note 99, at 20, ¶ 9.
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preparations in order to be able to set up the necessary structures and
processes for receiving payments. 146 An unresolved question is the role of
the ISA in the process of determining the value or volume of the resources
and the amount of the payments or contributions. It may be considered a
“gap” in UNCLOS that the ISA has not been expressly granted the
monitoring function needed to carry out the specific tasks under Article 82
in an efficient manner. Nevertheless, the entire process must, at the very
least, be transparent to the States Parties 147 as the payments constitute the
discharge of a legal obligation owed to the international community. These
payments can neither be considered charity nor development aid. The same
requirement of transparency also applies to the question as to whether a
particular developing country qualifies for the resource-specific exemption.
An important task of the ISA will be to define “equitable sharing criteria”
for the distribution of the payments received and to determine priorities
among potential recipients. It seems those States that are at the same time
least developed and landlocked would deserve to have priority. 148 It will be
for the ISA Council to recommend to the Assembly the necessary rules,
regulations, and procedures on equitable sharing. 149
To discharge what has been described as its “fiduciary duty to mankind
as a whole,” 150 it is indispensable that there are consultation and agreement
between a coastal State exploiting resources of the continental shelf beyond
200 nautical miles and the ISA. A model agreement has been developed,
perhaps with common provisions applicable to all such States and particular
ones for each individual case. 151 The focus of such agreements would be
exclusively on those aspects of production that are “central to the respective
responsibilities” under Article 82. 152 Another possibility may be the
conclusion of a memorandum of understanding, 153 which, although having
a different legal status than an agreement, might have the same practical
effect.

146. Id. at 43.
147. Id. at 19, ¶ 4.
148. See id. at 28, ¶ 7, 45.
149. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 162(2)(o)(i).
150. Lodge, The International Seabed Authority and Article 82, supra note 117, at 328.
151. ISA TECHNICAL STUDY NO: 12, supra note 99, at 47.
152. Id. at 45.
153. Id. at 31, ¶ 6.
256

The Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles

Vol. 97

It has rightly been pointed out that UNCLOS does not address how
disputes regarding the interpretation and application of Article 82 should be
resolved. 154 Besides the difficult question of whether engaging in a
contentious procedure would even be possible, the option of seeking an
advisory opinion should be borne in mind. Under Article 191, the Assembly
and the Council of the ISA are empowered to seek an advisory opinion from
the Seabed Disputes Chamber of ITLOS on “legal questions arising within
the scope of their activities.” 155 It may be assumed that these activities
include the tasks of the Authority under Article 82. 156 The rules of procedure
of ITLOS further provide for the possibility of rendering an advisory
opinion by the full tribunal, if this is provided for by an international
agreement related to the purposes of UNCLOS conferring jurisdiction on
it. 157
The interpretation and application of Article 82 raise difficult questions
that need to be further considered and resolved. The ISA has convened
several workshops aimed at providing guidance for implementing the
provisions of that Article. Many valuable suggestions were made at these,
some of which have been taken up. There can, however, be no doubt that
much work remains to be done. 158
VI.

CONCLUSION

The definition of the continental shelf set forth in Article 76 UNCLOS has
also become part of customary international law. Through their
jurisprudence, international courts and tribunals have clarified important
issues concerning the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. These
relate, in particular, to the concept of a “single” continental shelf and to the
possibility of its binding delimitation between adjacent or opposite coastal
States—in the absence of a recommendation by the CLCS regarding the
delineation of its outer limits. The potential problems that may arise from
areas of overlap between a State’s continental shelf and EEZ rights of
another State, resulting in so-called “grey areas,” are a matter to which the
negotiators at the Conference obviously did not devote sufficient attention.
154. See also id. at 58, ¶ 6.
155. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 191.
156. See also SUAREZ, supra note 45, at 250.
157. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Rules of the Tribunal art. 138 (2009),
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/basic_texts/Itlos_8_E_17_03_09.pdf.
158. Lodge, Relevance and Importance of the Work, supra note 31, at 3.
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The heavy workload, besides great responsibility, imposed by the
Convention on the members of the CLCS was also completely
underestimated at the time of its elaboration. The result is that the precise
extent of the international seabed Area—the common heritage of
mankind—will at least not be known for a very long time. This may also, to
a certain extent, affect the work of the ISA. With regard to revenue sharing
under Article 82 UNCLOS, the hope seems justified that this provision will
become operational in a foreseeable future. Its implementation, however,
still requires further in-depth consideration of, in particular, the role of the
ISA in the process of determining the value or volume of resources and the
amount of payments to be made by the coastal States concerned.
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